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The recent global financial tsunami has had economic consequences that have not been witnessed since the Great 
Depression. But while some countries suffered a particularly large contraction in economic activity on top of a 
system-wide banking and currency collapse, others came off relatively lightly. In this paper, we attempt to 
explain this cross-country variation in post-crisis experience, using a wide variety of pre-crisis explanatory 
variables in a sample of 46 medium-to-high income countries. We find that domestic macroeconomic imbalances 
and vulnerabilities were crucial for determining the incidence and severity of the crisis. In particular, we find that 
the pre-crisis rate of inflation captures factors which are important in explaining the post-crisis experience. Our 
results also suggest an important role for financial factors. In particular, we find that large banking systems 
tended to be associated with a deeper and more protracted consumption contraction and a higher risk of a 
systemic banking or currency crisis. Our results suggest that greater exchange rate flexibility coincided with a 
smaller and shorter contraction, but  at the same time increased  the risk of a banking and currency crisis. 
Countries with exchange rate pegs outside EMU were hit particularly hard, while inflation targeting seemed to 
mitigate the crisis.  Finally, we find some evidence suggesting a role for international real linkages and 
institutional factors. Our key results are robust to various alterations in the empirical setup and we are able to 
explain a significant share of the cross-country variation in the depth and duration of the crisis and provide quite 
sharp predictions of the incidence of banking and currency crises. This suggests that country-specific initial 
conditions played an important role in determining the economic impact of the crisis and, in particular, that 
countries with sound fundamentals and flexible economic frameworks were better able to weather the financial 
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The recent global financial tsunami has had  economic consequences  that have not been 
witnessed since the Great Depression. But while some countries suffered a particularly large 
contraction in economic activity on top of a system-wide banking and currency  collapse, 
others came off relatively lightly. This paper aims to explain this difference in cross-country 
experience by means of a non-structural econometric analysis using a variety of potential pre-
crisis explanatory variables in a cross-section of 46 medium-to-high income countries. The 
severity of the macroeconomic impact is measured in terms of depth and duration of the 
contraction in both output and consumption. Potential pre-crisis explanatory variables are 
chosen to reflect propagation channels for the global crisis  typically mentioned in the 
literature, i.e. a financial channel, a trade channel, a macro channel and an institutional 
channel, although we offer some new variables that have not been included in such analyses 
before as far as we know. As another contribution to the analysis of the current crisis, we also 
use cross-country probit regressions to identify the main determinants of the probability of a 
domestic systemic banking or currency crises during the current crisis. 
  Our results suggest  that the macro channel played a  prominent  role,  as  domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities  are found crucial for  determining  the 
incidence and  severity of the crisis.  An especially important pre-crisis  macroeconomic 
indicator, which seems to capture factors that are important in explaining the extent of the 
crisis along many different dimensions, is the rate of inflation in the run up to the crisis. We 
also find evidence suggesting the importance of financial factors. In particular, we find that 
large banking systems tended to be associated with a deeper and more protracted consumption 
contraction and a higher risk of a systemic banking or currency crisis. Our results suggest that 
greater exchange rate flexibility coincided with a smaller and shorter contraction, but at the 
same time increased the risk of a banking and currency crisis. We also find that countries with 
exchange rate pegs outside the European Monetary Union (EMU) were hit particularly hard, 
while inflation targeting seemed to mitigate the crisis.  Finally, we find some evidence 
suggesting a role for international real linkages and institutional factors.  
  Several recent papers attempt to explain the cross-country variation in the impact of 
the global crisis. For example, the findings in Berkmen et al. (2009) suggest that private 
sector leverage, credit growth, exchange rate flexibility, trade composition, and the fiscal 
position are important in explaining the cross-country variation in output growth forecast 
revisions. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) show that current account deficits, credit and 
output growth rates, and exposure to trade and production of traded goods are all important 
predictors for the impact of the crisis on post-crisis output and domestic demand (including 
consumption) growth rates. Other papers are more sceptical about the importance of initial 
conditions. Using output  growth, stock price and exchange rate changes and revisions to 
country’s credit ratings as crisis indicators, Rose and Spiegel (2009a, b) find that initial 
conditions have limited predictive power. Only pre-crisis asset price changes and current 
account deficits are found to be robust crisis predictors, while they find weaker evidence for a 
role of pre-crisis  credit growth.  Claessens et al. (2010) are also  somewhat  sceptical 
concerning the importance of initial conditions, although they find that credit growth, 3 
 
 
mortgage debt, asset price appreciation, current account deficits and trade openness can 
predict the severity of the output contraction and the post-crisis developments of a financial 
stress index. 
Our results, however, give us reason to be more optimistic on the predictive power of 
initial conditions in the current crisis, both in terms of explaining a significant share of the 
cross-country variation in the depth and duration of the crisis and in providing quite sharp 
predictions of the incidence of banking and currency crises.  This  therefore suggests  that 
country-specific initial conditions played an important role in determining the economic 
impact of the crisis and, in particular, that countries with sound fundamentals and flexible 
economic frameworks were better able to weather the financial storm. We find that these 
results are robust to various alterations in the empirical setup. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the country 
sample,  our crisis measures and  the potential explanatory variables  used in the analysis. 
Section 3 presents the empirical results, both with regard to the real economy effects of the 
crisis and the probability of a banking and currency crisis. Results from some sensitivity 
analyses are also reported. The section ends with an interpretation of the key results from the 
paper. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The data 
 
2.1. The country sample 
This section describes the country sample analysed in this paper. Since the incidence of the 
crisis and occurrences of domestic banking and currency crises was mainly notable in higher-
income countries, the focus is on countries in the upper half of the income spectrum. Thus, the 
aim is to include countries of similar income levels and size as OECD member countries. 
Hence, countries with PPP adjusted per capita GDP lower than the poorest OECD member 
country (Turkey) and PPP adjusted GDP level lower than the smallest OECD member country 
(Iceland) are excluded.
2
  Thus, the analysis includes all the 27 EU member countries, 6 other European 
countries and 13 countries outside of Europe. There are 27 industrial countries and 19 
emerging market economies, of which 12 are in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the 
analysis includes 7 very small open economies, i.e. countries with populations below 2.5 
million. 
 This gives a sample of 64 countries in total from the 227 countries 
recorded in the CIA World Factbook for the period 2006-2008. After eliminating countries 
with missing data, we are left with  46 countries, i.e. all the current 33  OECD member 
countries, plus Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,  Estonia, Hong Kong, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand. 
  The sample also includes countries with a wide array of monetary policy frameworks. 
Thus, there are the 16 EMU countries, 4 countries pegging their currency to the euro within 
                                                 
2 There is, however, one exception: Malta is included although its GDP level falls just short of Iceland’s level, in 
order to add one observation of a very small, open economy. 4 
 
 
the ERM2 framework and 4 other unilateral exchange rate pegs. There are also 22 countries 




The analysis therefore includes a country sample with a wide range of monetary frameworks. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the sample. 
2.2. Crisis indicators 
There is no single, optimal way to measure economic losses due to financial crises and the 
results from this paper and the others quoted in the Introduction clearly show the need to look 
at many different crisis indicators. Various measures have therefore been put forward in the 
literature. Some focus on the fiscal costs of crises (e.g. Hoelscher et al., 2003), which captures 
the transfer of income due to crisis resolution policies rather than the extent of economic costs 
of the crisis. While most papers focus on various measures of output losses, this paper also 
focuses on consumption losses, which we think is important as it is clear that a special feature 
of this crisis is the unusually prominent role played by the highly indebted household sector in 
propagating and amplifying the financial shock, with an exceptionally large consumption 
contraction occurring in many countries. We also focus on the duration of the crisis with the 
aim to analyse whether the same factors explain the depth and duration of the crisis or 
whether different factors play a role in explaining the cross-country variation in the speed of 
recovery.  
A common approach to measure the impact of crises on activity is to construct a 
counterfactual path in the absence of a crisis and measure the loss as the actual deviation from 
the constructed trend (see e.g. IMF, 1998, Bordo et al., 2001, and Laeven and Valencia, 
2008). This approach may overstate both the depth and the duration of the economic impact 
for countries were the run-up to the crisis is characterised by booms that make activity levels 
along the constructed trend unsustainable and therefore unattainable even in the absence of a 
crisis. Furthermore, countries are often heading for recessions before the crisis erupts without 
an unsustainable boom taking place and in those cases, comparisons of actual activity levels 
with simple trends may exaggerate the degree of losses due to the crisis (see Hoggarth et al., 
2002). 
Instead of constructing a counterfactual path for output or consumption in the absence 
of crisis, we therefore attempt to measure the depth of output (consumption) contraction as the 
log-difference of seasonally adjusted GDP (consumption) level between peak in the period 
from 2007Q1 to 2008Q4 and the level in 2009Q4 (our final data observation).
4
                                                 
3 Information on monetary regimes is based on the latest IMF de facto classification of exchange rate regimes 
and monetary policy frameworks from 23 February 2009 (using data from 31 April 2008), but updating the 
framework in Slovakia to reflect its EMU membership from January 2009. 
 Our approach 
has the advantage of avoiding the need to construct a counterfactual path for GDP or 
consumption in absence of the crisis. Possible disadvantages are that the peak level in the run 
up to the crisis can in some cases represent an unsustainable level with an adjustment being 
unavoidable with or without a financial crisis taking place. Hence, our measure may overstate 
4 Other measures were also considered, for example the difference between the 2007Q1-2008Q4 peak and the 
trough in 2008Q4-2009Q4 as well as the difference of the level in 2008Q3 and trough in 2008Q4-2009Q4. The 
results were very similar (with correlation between the measures all above 0.9).   5 
 
 
the economic loss due to the crisis in such cases but on the other hand, we are not 
extrapolating the growth level in the run up to the crisis which is likely to lead to an even 
further overstatement. In addition, the analysis ends in 2009Q4 which means that the full 
impact of the crisis may yet to be fully realised in some of the countries included. Our 
approach is similar to Cecchetti et al. (2009), who measure the depth of contractions 
following crises as the peak to trough decline in GDP where the peak is the highest GDP level 
within one year either side of the crisis date.  
Duration of output (consumption) contractions is measured as the number of quarters 
with negative quarter-on-quarter growth in seasonally adjusted GDP (consumption) from 
2008Q3 to 2009Q4. The starting point is chosen to capture the effects of the global crisis once 
it entered panic mode in September 2008 so as to avoid capturing normal business cycle 
adjustments unrelated to the crisis. Of course, it can be argued that tighter financial conditions 
due to the emerging global crisis from mid-2007 played a part in reinforcing the downturn in 
activity and bringing some advanced economies into recession at an earlier stage but we 
choose to focus our duration analysis on the impact of the crisis once it entered panic mode in 
late 2008.
5
We also want to analyse the cross-country variation in the probability of a banking and 
currency crisis. The incidence of a systemic banking crises is based on an updated version of 
the database in Laeven and Valencia (2008), generously provided by the authors, in addition 
to our own elaboration. They categorise 10 countries from our country sample to have 
experienced a systemic banking crisis during the global crisis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. We add Latvia, 
Russia and Switzerland (which Laeven and Valencia had as borderline cases at the time of our 
correspondence) to the list based on significant stress in the banking sectors of these countries 
and the extent of policy interventions. Hence, there are 13 incidences of systemic banking 
crises in our country sample. 
 
The definition of currency crises also follows Laeven and Valancia’s (2008) using 
BIS’s nominal effective exchange rate indices (see also Frankel and Rose, 1996). We 
categorise a country as having experienced a currency crisis if the annual average of the 
nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 30% or more in 2008-2009 and if this 
depreciation is also at least a 10 percentage points increase in the rate of depreciation 
compared to the two year period before. Given this definition, only two countries experienced 
a currency crisis between 2008 and 2009, Iceland and Korea, and therefore only Iceland 




                                                 
5 We also considered other measures of duration with similar results. Two examples were the number of quarters 
below peak and the number of quarters before two consecutive quarters of positive quarter-on-quarter growth, 
respectively. The correlation between these two measures, on the one hand, and the measure chosen on the other, 
is very high (above 0.8) for both output and consumption contractions. 
6 The Icelandic króna depreciated by roughly 48% in total between 2007 and 2009, while the Korean Won fell 
by 30%. Expanding the criteria to other countries with large depreciations in both 2008 and 2009, would next 
include Pound Sterling (22% depreciation between 2007 and 2009) and the Romanian lei (19% depreciation 
between 2007 and 2009). We decided however to stick to the stricter criteria as we find no supporting evidence 
suggesting that a currency crisis occurred in the UK during 2008-9. 6 
 
 
2.3. Potential pre-crisis explanatory variables 
We use a range of variables to analyse which factors played a role in determining the depth 
and duration of the contraction in activity, on one hand, and the probability of banking and 
currency crisis, on the other. In a broad sense, they can be categorised into four general 
channels from which the crisis was transmitted throughout the world economy: a financial 
channel  (reflecting factors such as financial structure, development and cross-country 
linkages), a trade channel (reflecting factors such as trade penetration, trade structure and 
business cycle synchronisation), a macro channel (reflecting macroeconomic volatility and 
imbalances), and a channel  reflecting  institutional  factors. To avoid possible endogeneity 
problems, all of our explanatory variables are measured at pre-crisis values, with most dated 
in 2006 or 2007 or values obtained from time series data with a cut-off point in 2007 or 
earlier. These variables and their motivation are further discussed in the following. A detailed 
list of variable definitions and sources can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Economic structure 
The first set of explanatory  variables includes two measures of economic size and 
development, i.e. the PPP-adjusted US dollar value of GDP and the corresponding per capita 
measure of GDP. The motivation of including these measures is to capture and control for the 
effects of size and development on the economic impact of the crisis and the probability of a 
banking and currency crisis.  
The global crisis originated in the advanced economies and spread throughout the 
globe (see, for example, Claessens et al., 2010), and the evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2010) suggests that the advanced economies were hit hardest by the crisis. This is different 
from many previous crises in the last few decades and reflects the advanced-economy nature 
of the current crisis. In fact, the experience from previous crises with regard to difference in 
output contraction in developed countries compared to their less developed counterparts is 
ambiguous,  although  large  consumption contractions are more frequently  observed  in the 
latter group. The frequency of banking and currency crises seems however remarkably similar 
in developed and developing countries (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Hoggarth et al., 2002, 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008, and Barro and Ursúa, 2008). To capture these effects, we include per 
capita GDP. But including per capita income can also serve as a proxy for other economic and 
institutional factors that are probably positively correlated with greater ability to absorb and 
respond to adverse shocks. However, as noted by Rose and Spiegel (2009a), this greater 
perceived ability to respond to crises may lead to greater moral hazard problems, thus leaving 
richer countries just as vulnerable as their less developed counterparts. 
The crisis has also generally been observed as a crisis were smaller countries, which 
make up a significant share of the country sample used here, have taken a particularly big hit 
(see the discussion in Rose and Spiegel, 2009a).  Many of these small countries had 
experienced large build-up of imbalances and were also heavily exposed to the collapse of 
international trade and activity and tightening financial conditions that followed the financial 
crisis  than larger economies. The smaller countries are probably also less able to absorb 




Financial structure and development 
As a second set of explanatory variables we include three different measures of financial 
structure and development. It is often argued that the level of financial sophistication reached 
during the years prior to the crisis, if not triggering the crisis, at least served to exacerbate it 
and propagate it around different financial markets and around the world through rising moral 
hazard problems, opaque and complicated financial instruments and the inability of financial 
regulators to effectively regulate the financial system.
7
The first variable we include measures financial deepening, using the ratio of broad 
money (M2) to GDP, a standard measure of development of financial markets and hence their 
ability to  absorb and  diversify  risk. A higher degree of financial  development could  be 
expected to be negatively related to the size and duration of the contraction following the 
crisis. However, if this measure merely reflects the ability of domestic agents to increase their 
leverage and hence contribute to greater imbalances through asset price bubbles and 
unsustainable balance sheets expansion, it could instead indicate greater vulnerability to the 
crisis and have a positive relation to the size of the crisis’ economic impact (cf. Dell’Ariccia 
et al., 2008, and Claessens et al., 2010).  
 At the same time, deeper financial 
markets can be more able to absorb shocks and support the recovery from a crisis than thin 
markets with few financial instruments for hedging risk that may even disappear completely 
during crisis periods. The question of sign of these effects is therefore ultimately an empirical 
one. 
  The second variable measures the size of the domestic banking system as the ratio of 
total assets of the five largest banks to GDP.
8 Large banking systems, with significant cross-
border operations, may have served to exacerbate the transmission of the global crisis to the 
domestic economy (cf. Davis, 2008, and Claessens et al., 2010). They may also stretch the 
ability of domestic regulators to deal with such large and complex banking systems and the 
fiscal resources to support the system in times of need.
9
                                                 
7 See, for example, the discussions in Rose and Spiegel (2009a) and the references therein. 
 They may also exacerbate the risk of 
regulative capture and the moral hazard problem related to the too-big-to-fail problem (cf. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 2009). Large banking systems with significant  cross-border 
operations are also more vulnerable to a liquidity crisis, such as happened in the current crisis 
as  the  host  country’s  lender-of-last resort abilities were  in many cases restricted to the 
domestic currency of which only a small share of the banking system’s assets and liabilities 
8 The results were robust to whether the three, four or five of the largest banks were used. We also tried using the 
largest domestically-owned banks listed in The Banker’s Top 1000 World Bank list (although the coverage was 
not as comprehensive as the one we use), which might be more closely related to the probability of banking 
crisis than our measure, e.g. due to sovereign’s contingent liabilities from supporting domestically-owned banks. 
However, the effects on our results were only minor. An alternative source would be the BIS’s consolidated 
banking statistics for national banking systems but that covers only half of our country sample. 
9 Due to data limitations, we could not include detailed banking system data often mentioned in the discussion as 
having played a role in the current crisis, such as such as banking interconnectedness, cross-currency funding 
needs, and currency and maturity mismatches present in banking systems in the run up to the crisis. Another 
potentially important pre-crisis condition missing due to data limitations is data on interbank turnover, which 
could capture the serious market disruption that occurred in many countries and differentiate more clearly 
between different types of market structures that could have played a role in the propagation of the crisis. 8 
 
 
are denominated in (cf. Buiter and Sibert, 2008). Finally, a relatively large banking system 
can also reflect excessive domestic credit expansion which is likely to contribute to the size of 
the crisis’ economic impact. The size of the banking system may also at the same time reflect 
the type of financial intermediation prevalent in the economy, i.e. whether bank lending or 
financial markets are most important for financial intermediation. A higher share of direct 
lending via credit markets may have been beneficial in the current crisis, for example if bank 
lending has been more affected than direct financing through the bond market.  
  Finally, as a third measure of financial development and structure, we use the ratio of 
stock market capitalisation to GDP. The stock market plays an important role in corporate 




  Deep stock markets could be expected to provide an important mean for 
channelling funds to medium-sized and large firms with productive investment opportunities 
in a time of crisis and cushion against bank credit retrenchment, in addition to allowing banks 
to raise new equity in an environment of rapidly deteriorating asset values. However, this is 
not necessarily true in a severe crisis. Declining equity prices can undermine corporate net 
worth, collateral values and limit their access to credit even further, decelerating investment 
and activity. Issuance of bank stock can also be problematic in practice in an environment of 
extensive counterparty risk and asset value uncertainty. Furthermore, high  stock market 
capitalisation can also reflect asset price bubbles and therefore be an indicator of vulnerability 
rather than financial development (cf. Rose and Spiegel, 2009a, b).  
International real linkages 
The financial crisis literature stresses the importance of international trade as a key channel of 
crisis contagion. With the global recession causing a sharp decline in global demand, the spill-
over effects can be expected to be greater in countries with closer ties to the global economy 
(cf. Rose and Spiegel, 2009b, and Levchenko et al., 2009). We therefore add as a third set of 
explanatory variables five different measures of macroeconomic exposure to external shocks 
through trade linkages. 
To capture the effects of trade intensity, we use a standard measure of trade openness, 
i.e. the ratio of  the sum of  exports and imports  of goods and services to GDP. As a 
complimentary measure of these global real linkages, we also add a proxy for the link 
between the domestic and global business cycles, i.e.  the contemporaneous correlation 
between the domestic and global output gaps, measured as de-trended output (using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter).
11
                                                 
10 Understandably, stock markets play a large role in market-based economies and therefore also reflect the type 
of financial system in each country. 
  Furthermore, with the global recession dominated by a large 
contraction in demand for manufacturing goods across the globe, it can also be argued that 
11 Note that the simple correlation may overstate the co-movement for the large economies as they represent a 
significant part of the world output measure used here. To adjust for this, an alternative measure of world output 
excluding the largest economies individually was constructed (using constant US dollar price data obtained from 
Eurostat). Hence, to calculate the US correlation, US output was compared to world output excluding the US. A 
similar adjustment was made for the other five large economies (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK). 
This led to a significant reduction in the correlation for Japan, the UK and the US, but had no effect on the 
measured correlation for the other three countries. 9 
 
 
countries whose exports are dominated by manufacturing goods were hit particularly hard by 
the crisis. To capture this compositional aspect, we therefore also include as a third variable 
the share of manufacturing goods in total merchandise exports. 
The final two variables capture the possible effects of trade patterns on the 
transmission of the global shock to  the domestic economy through the  trade  channel. 
Countries that export only a narrow range of goods or have trade concentrated on few markets 
may be expected to be more vulnerable to the global crisis than countries who export a broad 
menu of goods to many markets.  These effects are captured by two indices on trade 
diversification and trade concentration. The first index measures how a country’s exports 
differ from that of the average country. A country with a narrow export base will have a high 
value of this index. The second index measures the degree of market concentration in trade. A 
country with exports concentrated on few markets will have a high value of this index. 
 
International financial linkages 
The fourth set of explanatory variables proxies the extent of financial linkages with the global 
economy. These variables are included to capture the extent of countries’ linkages with the 
international financial system as the crisis rapidly spread from the main financial centres to 
other countries across the globe (cf. Davis, 2008, and Rose and Spiegel, 2009b). It can be 
expected that closer financial links enhanced the spill-over of the financial shock to domestic 
financial systems. But at the same time, it can also be argued that stronger ties to the global 
financial system can facilitate a more rapid recovery from the crisis through greater access to 
global finance once the crisis hit. 
To capture the extent of financial exposure to the global economy we use a general 
measure of financial openness, given as the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to 
GDP, which is commonly used in the literature, cf. Kose et al. (2009). A high ratio implies 
stronger  financial links with the international economy  and therefore greater exposure to 
disruptions in credit markets and international asset price reversals.
12
Closely related is a measure of the extent of capital inflows, given as the ratio of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to GDP. The reversibility of capital flows and the risk 
of sudden stop crises is a recurrent theme in the literature and the idea behind this variable is 
to capture the vulnerability of countries’ risk to reversal due to the global crisis which could 
increase the economic impact. We follow Forbes and Chinn (2004) and use FDI inflows as a 
measure of vulnerability to capital inflows reversal. FDI inflows may, however, not be the 
type of inflows most sensitive to such abrupt reversals but data limitations prevented us from 
using other measures such as foreign portfolio flows and foreign bank loans, which may be 
 But as pointed out by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), a high ratio also reflects a more internationally diversified 
asset portfolio and can therefore also reflect some valuable diversification in the event of 
instability in the domestic financial system.  The question whether a large international 
balance sheet is associated with a greater or lesser exposure to the global crisis is therefore 
ultimately an empirical one. 
                                                 
12 This ignores the importance of the structure of external assets and liabilities, e.g. the share of equity versus 
short-term debt in liabilities and the degree of risk in foreign asset holdings. 10 
 
 
more important drivers of capital flow reversals (see e.g. Tong and Wei, 2009). This view has 
though been questioned, with Dooley et al. (1994) finding a high level of FDI to be associated 
with high variability in capital flows and Frankel and Rose (1996) finding currency crashes to 
be related to episodes where FDI inflows dry up.  
The final financial linkages variable is meant to capture the possible positive effects of 
global financial ties through a ‘global security net’ and is given as an indicator variable for 
access to the US Federal Reserve extraordinary US dollar liquidity swap facilities in the 
autumn of 2008. The Fed provided US dollar liquidity to a selection of central banks to ease 
pressure that occurred in US dollar short-term wholesale funding markets (McGuire and von 
Peter, 2009, and Allen and Moessner, 2010).
13 Thus, the indicator variable takes the value of 





Underlying economic volatility 
The fifth set of variables includes three measures of  underlying economic volatility. In 
general, greater economic volatility can reflect frequent or large shocks, or poor success in 
dealing with shocks, e.g. due to weak institutions and lack of credibility. Greater underlying 
volatility could therefore be expected to make countries more vulnerable to the global crisis. 
But greater volatility in some macroeconomic variables can also capture greater flexibility 
which can foster a swift adjustment to shocks and support a more rapid recovery.  
To capture these different dimensions of the link between crisis vulnerability and 
economic volatility, we first include a variable measuring business cycle volatility using the 
standard deviation of the output gap (using Hodrick-Prescott de-trended output) for quarterly 
data over the period from 1985 to 2007.  
The second variable is the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, measured as the 
standard deviation of quarterly nominal effective exchange rates in the period from 1994 to 
2007.  A more volatile exchange rate can reflect a number of factors, e.g. underlying 
instability  in  the economy, high and volatile inflation and  monetary policy’s  lack of 
credibility and transparency (e.g. Kuttner and Posen, 2000). But a more volatile exchange rate 
can also reflect greater exchange rate flexibility that can help mitigate economic shocks such 
as the recent global crisis through improved competitiveness of the domestic economy due to 
depreciation of the domestic currency.
15
                                                 
13 Swap lines were set up with the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank in December 2007. These 
lines were expanded considerably following Lehman Brother’s collapse and similar swap lines were set up with 
the central banks of Japan, UK, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, 
Korea and Singapore. These facilities were terminated in early 2010 but some were reintroduced in May 2010 
when funding pressures emerged again.  
  
14 The use of this indicator variable in our analysis may be problematic in the sense that the introduction of swap 
lines between central banks was part of the crisis response of monetary authorities. Any effects of this variable 
can therefore reflect a reverse causality instead of being a truly exogenous regressor.  
15 This shock-absorber role of a flexible exchange rate can be limited in practice however if currency mismatches 
are widespread as non-financial private sector or public sector balance sheets will be dealt a heavy blow by the 
depreciation, causing widespread repayment problems and write-downs of banks’ assets.  Data limitations 
prevent us from including these currency mismatches in the analysis.  11 
 
 
But not all currency movements serve to facilitate economic adjustment. As a final 
variable capturing underlying economic volatility, we therefore also add a measure of the 
non-fundamental part of exchange rate volatility. This measure is obtained from Pétursson 
(2010), which uses the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination to estimate 
the lower bound of the variance of a time-varying exchange rate risk premium within a 
rational-expectations signal extraction approach. The idea behind including this variable is 
that the more volatile the exchange rate risk premium is, the more vulnerable the economy is 
to the financial crisis.  
 
Economic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
The sixth set of initial conditions includes variables capturing macroeconomic conditions just 
before the crisis hit. The idea is that the larger the macroeconomic imbalances, the more 
vulnerable the economy is to adverse changes in financial and economic conditions. This is a 
well known characteristic of financial crises. Barajas et al. (2009) show for example that large 
macroeconomic imbalances tend to increase the probability of a crisis. They also find that the 
larger the imbalances, the longer the contraction following the crisis tends to be. 
As a first measure of macroeconomic imbalances, we include the rate of inflation in 
2007. Inflation control is likely to reflect the quality of policy institutions and the extent of 
demand pressures within  each country, both of which can be expected to influence how 
vulnerable countries are to a global financial crisis and the possibility for policy makers to use 
monetary stimulus measures to cushion against adverse shocks. Thus, we expect countries 
with low inflation and better anchored inflation expectations to have greater scope to ease 
monetary policy more aggressively and be more effective in transforming lower policy rates 
into lower medium and long-term real rates than countries that were also dealing with 
inflationary problems by the time the crisis hit. 
The second variable we include to capture macroeconomic imbalances is the current 
account balance as a share of GDP. Countries  running  current account deficits are more 
reliant  on foreign financing and  are therefore more  exposed to  a  sudden stop of capital 
inflows, which is a frequent characteristic of financial crises (cf. Claessens et al., 2009). The 
ensuing balance of payment adjustment usually takes the form of rapidly declining domestic 
demand and currency depreciation. Larger deficits are likely to require larger adjustments in 
domestic demand and the exchange rate which can, if large enough, lead to a currency and 
banking crises through the depreciation’s effect on domestic balance sheets (cf. Fratzscher, 
2009). 
Third, we include a variable capturing financial leverage of domestic balance sheets. 
In general terms, leverage refers to the degree to which assets are funded by debt and is 
therefore a useful indicator of balance sheet vulnerabilities. Excessive increase in leverage is 
also typically related to credit and asset price bubbles. At the time the bubbles burst and the 
crisis hits, private sector balance sheets are therefore particularly exposed to collapsing asset 
prices and refinancing risks and households and firms need to rapidly unwind their balance 
sheets which further exacerbates the slowdown of economic activity (see, for example, Rose 
and Spiegel, 2009a, b, and Claessens et al., 2010). Various leverage measures have been used 12 
 
 
in the literature, such as the debt-to-equity ratio and the debt-to-assets ratio. However, due to 
data limitations we follow Berkmen et al. (2009) and measure leverage with the ratio of 
domestic credit to domestic deposits. This compares total credit to a relatively liquid and 
limited form of assets but can nevertheless be expected to reflect the degree of balance sheet 
vulnerability and therefore how fragile countries  are  to tighter financial conditions and 
declining asset prices brought upon by the global crisis. 
Fourth, we include two variables capturing the underlying vulnerability of the fiscal 
authority, i.e. fiscal balances and government debt (both measured as a ratio to GDP). These 
two variables should capture both the ability of the fiscal authority to respond to the crisis 
through a fiscal stimulus and the transmission of the crisis through the risk premium on 
government debt with possible repercussions on funding and debt sustainability. Higher debt 
levels and larger deficits are therefore expected to make countries more vulnerable to the 
crisis and limit their ability to mitigate its real effects. If debt sustainability is questioned due 
to high debt levels or large refinancing needs and causes considerable increase in risk premia, 
the government may have to introduce strict fiscal austerity measures that will further increase 
the contraction in domestic demand in the short run.  
The final measure introduced to capture macroeconomic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities is central bank foreign reserves as a ratio to GDP. Low levels of reserves prior 
to the crisis may suggest limited capability of the monetary authority to support the domestic 
currency in a situation where the currency comes under pressure, as often occurs in times of 
financial stress. Limited reserves also reflect restricted ability to provide foreign currency 
liquidity support to  the  domestic banking system in times of financial panic as occurred 
during the US dollar liquidity shortage as previously discussed.  Thus, countries with 
relatively low reserves can be expected to be hit harder by the crisis as their local currency 






One can expect countries with stronger institutions to be better able to cope with crisis 
situations and in general to deliver a more stable macroeconomic environment (cf. Acemoglu 
et al., 2003), which may also make countries less vulnerable to the crisis as discussed above. 
The seventh set of initial conditions  therefore  includes  ten  variables capturing different 
institutional aspects.  
First, we include four different measures of institutional quality: two separate proxies 
of governance quality from the World Bank, i.e. one measure of government efficiency and 
another of regulatory quality; a proxy for the quality of the legal system from the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index; and an index of central bank independence 
from  Fry et al.  (2000).  We expect  countries with a stronger governance structure and a 
                                                 
16  The size of foreign reserves was to a certain extent made less important for countries with access to 
international swap lines. Of the main international centres, the euro area, the UK, Switzerland and Australia 
would have depleted a substantial fraction of their foreign currency reserves if they would have had to provide 
foreign currency liquidity out of their reserves without the use of central bank swap lines according to Allen and 
Moessner (2010).  13 
 
 
sounder legal system to be more able to reduce the probability of imbalances building up, e.g. 
through reducing the risk of regulative capture. Greater central bank autonomy can also be 
argued to  reduce the risk of crises by  better  insulating monetary policy from political 
pressures and therefore reducing the time-inconsistency problem and supporting  firmer 
anchoring of inflation expectations.  
Second, we include four measures of flexibility  of markets, based on the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index: indices of regulatory burden in credit and 
labour markets, respectively, a measure of regulatory burden in overall business transactions, 
and a summary index of overall economic freedom (the EFW-index). Here, the idea is that 
greater flexibility and less regulatory burden may help economies recover faster from a crisis. 
But at the same time, it is often argued that one of the key drivers in the current crisis was ‘too 
much’ freedom and lax supervision of private sector behaviour. The possible effects of these 
institutional features are therefore not necessarily clear a priori. 
Finally, we include two indicator variables capturing past crisis experience, i.e. 
whether countries have experienced systemic banking or currency crises in the previous 30 
years. It is often argued that countries that have experienced such crises in the past tend to 
learn from earlier mistakes and avoid allowing such vulnerabilities to build up again. Past 
crises experience should therefore reduce the negative effects of the current one. However, it 
can also be argued that recurring crises reflect weak institutions and lack of credibility, which 
takes a long time to recuperate.  Hence, past crises experience can make countries more 
vulnerable to rapid loss of confidence once a new crisis hits. The links between past crises 
experience and the current financial crisis are therefore not obvious. 
 
Monetary and exchange rate regimes 
Although no exchange rate peg has been dismantled in the current global crisis, such a 
collapse has marked many crises in the last two decades, and was often linked to severe 
banking, corporate or sovereign debt crises. Many commentators have also argued that the 
exchange rate regime played a key role in the current crisis. Thus, some have argued that 
euro-membership was crucial in preventing a complete collapse in Ireland, Malta and some of 
the Southern European countries, while others have argued that the flexible exchange rate 
regime played a key role in the banking collapse and large contraction in activity experienced 
in Iceland. Others have, however, highlighted the  benefit of a flexible exchange rate for 
supporting the post-crisis recovery. At the same time, some have argued that the strong focus 
on inflation control that comes with the inflation targeting regime played an important 
detrimental role in the build up of vulnerabilities in the run up to the financial crisis in some 
of the inflation targeting countries, with Iceland a particular case in point. 
As a final set of initial conditions, we therefore include indicator variables capturing 
different monetary and exchange rate regimes within the country sample. The aim of 
including these regime variables is to analyse to what extent different monetary regimes 
played a role in the crisis and whether any particular regime reduced or added to the impact of 14 
 
 
the crisis, after controlling for the initial conditions discussed above.
17
 
 As discussed in the 
previous section, the country sample includes 16 countries that have a common monetary 
policy and currency through EMU membership. In addition, there are 8 countries following 
some type of a unilateral exchange rate peg, either through a currency board or other softer 
forms of a fixed exchange rate regime. Finally, there are 22 countries with a floating exchange 
rate, of which 19 follow an explicit IT framework and the others broadly following a 
framework similar to IT. 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Before turning to the formal analysis of the key determinants of the economic impact from the 
global crisis, it can be useful to look for patterns in the data that may suggest what to expect 
from a more formal analysis. Table 2 therefore reports average values for all the variables 
analysed in the paper for the whole country sample and for various interesting country groups. 
  First, looking at the whole country sample, Table 2 shows that the average output loss 
in the crisis was 5.5%, whereas the average consumption loss was slightly smaller or 4.4%.
18 
This indicates that output contraction in the global crisis during our sample period was less 
than the 6.3% average for a severe recession in the period 1960-2007 in the 21 OECD country 
sample analysed in Claessens et al. (2009). The consumption contraction is, on the other hand, 
much larger in the current crisis than the 1.2% average they report. This large consumption 
contraction is therefore a key characteristic of the recent global crisis and underlines the 
importance of looking beyond  measures of  output losses. The average duration of the 
contraction period for the whole country sample ranges from roughly 3 quarters for 
consumption to closer to 4 quarters for output. The average frequency of a systemic banking 
crisis was 28%, while a currency crisis only occurred in 4% of the sample.
19
Looking at different country groups,  it appears that despite greater incidence of 
banking system crises, the contraction in economic activity was smaller in the industrial 
countries than in the less developed countries. This might at first glance seem at conflict with 
the previous claim that this crisis, unlike most previous financial crises, has hit more 
developed countries harder than less developed countries. This, however, simply reflects the 
choice of including only medium-to-high income countries in the analysis. The table also 
shows that very small open economies and countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs were 
hit particularly hard. Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that countries whose real 
economy suffered the most had significant macroeconomic imbalances prior to the crisis, 
were highly leveraged, and had less flexible exchange rates, whereas countries which had the 
  
                                                 
17 For example, Berkmen et al. (2009) find evidence that countries with exchange rate pegs experienced a more 
severe contraction than countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes. Against this, the results in Coulibaly 
(2009) indicate that countries within currency unions are less likely to experience a currency crisis. 
18 The variation in consumption loss across the country sample is however much larger than the variation in 
output loss: the standard deviation of consumption loss equals 8.7% while the standard deviation of output loss 
equals 5.8%. 
19 The real economy crisis indicators are positively correlated, but not overwhelmingly so. The correlations range 
from 0.39 between the duration of output and consumption loss to 0.78 between the depth of output and 
consumption loss. The correlations between the banking and currency crises incidences and the correlations of 
those indicators with the real economy indicators are all well below 0.3. 15 
 
 
greatest banking and currency crises incidences tend to be those who had large and integrated 
financial systems and large macroeconomic imbalances prior to the crisis. The next section 
takes a more formal view on these possible links. 
 
3. Empirical results  
In this section, we move on to a more formal analysis of the relevance of different initial 
conditions in explaining the depth and duration of the output and consumption contraction, 
using cross-country regressions, and the probability of a systemic banking and currency crisis, 
using cross-country probit regressions. The two following sections report the main results, 
while Section 3.3 reports some sensitivity analysis. The economic interpretation of the main 
results is relegated to Section 3.4.  
Note that the explanatory variables predate the crisis and the analysis is therefore an 
attempt to identify what factors were important in predicting the depth and duration of the 
contraction and whether countries experienced banking or currency crisis or both. 
Furthermore, with the large number of potential explanatory variables included in this study 
and limited guidance from theory on exactly what factors to include, we necessarily had to 
undertake some  experimentation before arriving at the preferred baseline specifications 
presented. Thus, all the potential variables were tested but only those found to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels are retained. 
 
3.1. The real economy effects of the crisis 
Tables 3-6 present the main results, i.e. the preferred baseline specifications and the marginal 
contributions of additional dummy variables for different monetary and exchange rate 
regimes. As the tables show, we are able to explain up to three-quarters of the cross-country 
variation in output and consumption loss with a limited set of pre-crisis indicators. Thus, we 
immediately obtain the important result that initial conditions have mattered in this crisis, 




The depth of the contraction 
The macro channel seems to have played a particularly important role in determining the 
depth of the real economy contraction during the current crisis, both through macroeconomic 
volatility and macroeconomic imbalances in the run up to the crisis. This is especially true for 
inflation which seems to  capture factors that were crucial in determining how large the 
contraction in output and consumption turned out to be. The baseline results (Specification 1 
in Tables 3 and 4) suggest that a 1 percentage point higher inflation prior to the crisis 
coincided with 1.6 percentage point deeper contraction in output and a 2.4 percentage point 
deeper contraction in consumption, respectively. The baseline results also suggest that output 
                                                 
20 As the tables show, we are only able to explain one-third to half of the cross-country variation in crisis 
duration. That we are able to explain less of the country variation in crisis duration than crisis depth probably 
reflects the fact that the variation in duration across countries is smaller than the variation in depth. Again, this 
may reflect the fact that the crisis is still being played out in some countries and greater variation in the duration 
of the crisis can be expected once the crisis is fully completed. 16 
 
 
volatility had a sizeable effect, with a 1 percentage point higher standard deviation in the 
output gap coinciding with a 3 percentage point larger output contraction. There are also 
effects from private sector leverage, with a 10 percentage point higher leverage relative to 
GDP coinciding with a 0.2 percentage point deeper contraction in output. However, a more 
flexible exchange rate seems to have contributed to a smaller output contraction: a 1 
percentage point higher standard deviation of the effective nominal exchange rate coincided 
with a 0.9 percentage point smaller contraction in output. The macro channel also had an 
effect on the consumption contraction through the current account balance, with the baseline 
results in Table 4 implying that a 10 percentage point better current account position leading 
to the crisis coincided with a 2.5 percentage point smaller consumption contraction. 
  There is also a role for the trade and financial channels in determining the extent of the 
output and consumption contractions. Thus, closer ties to the world economy, through a 0.1 
higher correlation of the domestic and world business cycle, coincided with a 0.7 percentage 
point deeper output contraction, while countries with bigger banking systems tended to have a 
larger consumption contraction: a country with a banking system that was 1 GDP larger than 
the average country tended to have a 1.3 percentage point larger contraction in consumption. 
In addition, we find that countries which experienced a systemic banking crisis in the past 
tended to have a 3.3 percentage point larger consumption contraction compared to countries 
which have not experienced such a crisis in the past 30 years. 
Finally, our results suggest that countries with some kind of unilateral exchange rate 
pegs were hit particularly hard by the crisis, while we find no significant additional effects for 
the EMU countries. Countries with floating exchange rates came out better, in particular if 
they also had a formal inflation target. Thus, countries outside EMU with an exchange rate 
peg experienced an almost 8 percentage point larger contraction in consumption compared to 
other countries, while countries with an inflation target tended to have a 2.5 percentage point 
smaller contraction in output and 3.2 percentage point smaller contraction in consumption.  
 
The duration of the contraction 
We also find that the macro channel played a key role in determining the length of the crisis 
(Specification 1 in Tables 5 and 6). Again, we find that higher inflation in the run up to the 
crisis is reflected in a more protracted economic impact, with a 1 percentage point higher 
inflation coinciding with a roughly 0.3 quarters longer contraction in output and 0.5 quarters 
contraction in consumption, respectively. Higher government debt prior to the crisis also 
seems to have coincided with a longer output contraction: a 10 percentage point higher debt 
ratio coincided with a 0.1 quarter longer output contraction. Just as with the depth of the 
crisis, we find that greater exchange rate variability tended to coincide with a more rapid 
recovery: a 1 percentage point higher standard deviation in the nominal exchange rate 
coincided  with a 0.3 quarters shorter output contraction and a 0.2 quarters shorter 
consumption contraction. 
  We also find some role for the financial channel in determining the length of the 
output contraction. Thus, the more financially open countries tended  to experience a 
somewhat longer contraction, although the effects are quite small. For example, increasing 17 
 
 
our measure of financial openness by 1 GDP lengthens the output contraction by 0.03 
quarters. There are also negative effects from the extent of capital inflows: increasing the ratio 
of capital inflows to GDP by 10 percentage points, coincides with a 0.7 quarters longer output 
contraction. However, we find that countries more open to trade experienced a shorter output 
contraction: increasing the share of trade to GDP by 10 percentage points reduces the duration 
of the output contraction by 0.1 quarter. The results also indicate that countries which have 
experienced a currency crisis in the past tended  to have a 0.7 quarters longer output 
contraction than countries which had not experienced such a crisis in the past 30 years. 
Finally, we find no additional effects from the monetary and exchange rate regime 
dummies, except that countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs experienced a 1 quarter 
longer consumption contraction than countries with floating exchange rates or peg within 
EMU. 
 
3.2. The probability of a banking and currency crisis 
To estimate the  probability of a systemic banking or a currency crisis, we estimate  a 
multivariate ordered probit model. Tables 7-9 report the results for a banking, currency and 
twin crisis, respectively.
21 Since probit coefficients are difficult to interpret, we also report the 
marginal effects measured as a one-unit change in the regressors on the probability of a crisis, 
evaluated at the mean of the data.
22
Before proceeding to individual results, it is important to note that the estimation 
results for the currency crisis incidences need to be interpreted with some caution as the 
frequency of such crises is very low in the country sample (two currency crises and one twin 
crisis). These results should therefore be thought more of as indicative. This is much less of a 
problem for the estimation of a banking crisis, where there are 13 crisis observations (28% of 
the sample). 
 However, for binary regressors, we report the effect of a 
change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a crisis. For the twin crisis specification, we only 
report the marginal effects on the probability of a banking or currency crisis, as the marginal 
effects on the probability of a twin crisis were extremely small, with twin crises found to be 
highly unlikely in this data set. The marginal effects on the probability of no crisis were 
therefore practically identical (but with opposite signs) to the marginal effects of either a 
banking or currency crisis. The tables also report some diagnostic statistics, including the 
success of correctly predicting a crisis (using a cut-off point of 50%) and a measure of 
improvement over a simple constant-probability model (a probit model which only includes a 
constant). 
                                                 
21 For the banking and currency crisis specifications, the indicator variable takes on the value 1 if a banking 
(currency) crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. For the twin crisis specification the indicator variable takes on the value 
0 if neither a banking nor currency crisis occurs, one if either a banking or currency crisis occurs and 2 if a twin 
crisis occurs. We also tried separating the banking and currency crisis incidence in the crisis indicator (thus 
allowing four mutually exclusive outcomes: no crisis, a banking crisis, a currency crisis and a twin crisis). The 
results obtained are very similar to those reported. In particular, the same variables remain significant in both 
specifications. 
22 Thus, for single-digit percentages the unit change measures a rise of 1 percentage point, while for double-digit 
or higher percentages the unit change measures a rise of 10 percentage points. For GDP per capita the unit 




Determinants of a banking crisis 
The variables that significantly predict a systemic banking crisis are reported in Table 7. First, 
higher GDP per capita is found to have coincided with a higher probability of a banking crisis. 
This finding simply reflects the fact that a higher frequency of banking failures in the current 
financial crisis is found among higher income countries and therefore has no  obvious 
structural implication. More interestingly, a larger banking system prior to the crisis is found 
to  have  coincided  with higher probability of banking crisis. The marginal effect in the 
baseline specification (Specification 1) suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
share of banking system assets to GDP increased the probability of a banking crisis by 1 
percentage point. Higher pre-crisis inflation is also associated with a higher probability of a 
banking crisis. The baseline specification suggests that a 1 percentage point higher inflation in 
the run up to the crisis raised the probability of a banking crisis by 12 percentage points. 
Finally, a higher level of foreign reserves relative to GDP is found to decrease the probability 
of a banking crisis, with the marginal effects suggesting that a 10 percentage point higher 
ratio of reserves to GDP reduced the probability of a banking crisis by almost 5 percentage 
points. 
  The table also reports the effects of adding dummy variables for different monetary 
regimes. The dummy variables for EMU membership and countries with unilateral exchange 
rate pegs are not found to be significant, but the dummy variables for IT countries and 
floating exchange rate countries are found significant at the 5% critical level. The results 
suggest that the probability of a banking crisis was 8 percentage points lower for the IT 
countries than for non-IT countries, other things equal, while the probability was almost 6 
percentage points lower for the floating exchange rate countries in general. Note also that the 
original  regressors remain highly significant although  that the marginal effects decline 
somewhat when the regime dummies are added. 
 
Determinants of a currency crisis 
Table 8 reports the variables that significantly predict a currency crisis. It should, however, be 
noted from the outset that with only two observations of currency crisis, these results by and 
large pick up the difference between Iceland and Korea, on one hand, and the whole country 
sample, on the other. Sweeping conclusions cannot therefore be drawn. That said, we again 
find that GDP per capita needs to be included as a control variable. A larger banking system is 
also found to have coincided with a higher probability of a currency crisis. There are also 
positive effects on the probability of a currency crisis from greater exchange rate flexibility 
and higher fiscal deficits prior to the crisis. However, better institutions, as reflected in greater 
central bank independence and fewer incidences of past banking crises are found to have 
coincided  with a lower probability of a currency crisis in the current crisis. With the 
probability of currency crisis extremely low, the marginal effects of changes in the 
explanatory variables are found to be very small, as shown in Table 8. Furthermore, note that 
we are not able to add the regime dummies as the maximum likelihood procedure breaks 




Determinants of a twin crisis 
Finally, Table 9 reports the significant variables predicting a twin crisis. As for the previous 
two crisis variables, GDP per capita is needed as a control variable. The size of the banking 
system and the level of inflation are also found to have positively coincided with a twin crisis, 
with similar marginal effects as found for the baseline specification on the probability of a 
banking crisis in Table 7. Greater exchange rate variability and higher fiscal deficits are also 
found to have coincided with higher probability of a currency crisis, similar to the findings in 
Table 8, with a 1 percentage point increase in these variables raising the probability of a 
banking or currency crisis by 6 and 3 percentage points, respectively. However, a 10 
percentage point increase in financial deepening is found to have reduced the probability of a 
banking or currency crisis by roughly 1 percentage point. Finally, none of the regime 
dummies are found to be significant. 
 
Estimated banking and currency crisis probabilities 
The probit models are quite successful in predicting the banking and currency crises correctly. 
The three baseline specifications (Specifications 1) predict the incidences correctly in 80-98% 
of the cases (using a cut-off point of 50%), sometimes with some improvements when the 
regime dummies are added. The baseline specifications also show a significant improvement 
over a simple constant-probability alternative, with the percentage gain ranging from 30-50%. 
The models are also generally able to make a sharp distinction between crisis and non-crisis 
countries: the crisis probabilities tend to lie above 90% or below 10% in 59-91% of the cases 
and above 80% and below 20% in 76-96% of the cases. 
The banking crisis regression in Table 7 correctly predicts a banking crisis in Belgium, 
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland with close to 100% 
probability and in the UK with a slightly lower probability, or 70%. The model predicts a 
banking crisis in Austria and the US with just short of 50% probability, and assigns an even 
lower probability to a banking crisis in Denmark (34%), Russia, (23%) and Germany (18%). 
There are also a few cases of false warnings: the model predicts a banking crisis in Sweden 
with a 70%  probability and a banking crisis in Estonia, Hungary and Norway with a 
probability just above 50%.
23 A somewhat smaller probability is assigned to a crisis in Spain, 
or 31%.
24
The currency crisis regression in Table 8 predicts a currency crisis in Iceland with a 
93% probability, but fails to predict the currency crisis in Korea (only 15% probability). It 
 However, as Figure 3(a) shows, only four of the incorrect predictions are larger 
than two standard errors. 
                                                 
23 Allen and Moessner (2010) doubt that Sweden and Denmark could have provided effective support to their 
banks in the absence of swap lines from the Fed after the Lehman Brother’s failure and from the ECB a little 
later as the necessary provision of foreign currency liquidity would have used up most of their reserves. Swedish 
banks in Estonia received support from their mother companies and the Swedish Riksbank set up swap lines with 
their Estonian counterpart. Hungary did turn to the IMF and the European Union for considerable support and 
the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank set up swap facilities with the Hungarian central bank to 
provide commercial banks within the country with access to euro and Swiss franc liquidity. 
24 Problems among Spanish saving banks became clear in May 2010, outside of our sample period, when the 
Bank of Spain seized control of CajaSur and merger plans among the remaining Cajas intensified. 20 
 
 
also incorrectly assigns quite a high probability  of a currency crisis in Israel (43%) and 
Bulgaria (23%) –  but only the prediction errors for Korea and Israel are found to be 
significant at the 95% critical level (Figure 3(b)). 
Finally, the probit specification for the twin crisis in Table 9 is better able to predict 
the banking crisis in Austria, Russia, the UK and the US than the banking crisis specification 
in Table 7 but seems less certain about the crisis in Latvia (Figure 4). For other countries, the 
crisis predictions are very similar to those from the banking crisis specification. Of the false 
banking crisis predictions, the high probabilities of a banking crisis in Hungary and Sweden 
remain, but the probabilities for Estonia, Norway and Spain decline substantially. Against 
this, the model incorrectly predicts a crisis in Bulgaria with a 54% probability. Furthermore, 
the false currency crisis in Israel has disappeared. Finally, the model predicts the twin crisis in 
Iceland correctly, with a 79% probability. 
 
3.3. Robustness tests 
As a first robustness test, we try retaining the GDP level and GDP per capita as controls in all 
the baseline regressions in Tables 3-9, capturing the greater crisis impact in higher income 
countries and smaller countries, as discussed before. In all cases are these variables non-
significant (except in the banking and currency crisis equations, were the significant GDP per 
capita variable is already included) and in no case does the inference on other explanatory 
variables change. With a relatively large number of small countries in our sample, it could 
also be the case that the small countries are given unduly large weights in the empirical 
findings, thus somewhat blurring how the global crisis spread from its epicentre in the US to 
other large countries. To test for the sensitivity of our results to a possible small-country bias 
we therefore re-estimate all the regressions using weighted least squares, with the log of GDP 
as a scaling variable. However, we find that our results are insensitive to this and in no case is 
the inference altered. 
We also try  adding different country group dummy variables to the baseline 
regressions, reported in Table 10. First, we add country dummy variables for OECD 
countries, EU countries, emerging market countries, the central and eastern European 
countries, and the very small open economies. As Table 10 shows, these dummy variables are 
found insignificant in almost all cases. Furthermore, the addition of these variables is not 
found to alter the statistical properties of the other explanatory variables.
25
Next, we split the country group into income and size quartiles using GDP per capita 
and GDP levels, respectively, and add dummy variables defining different income and size 
groups to the baseline regressions. Table 10 reports the estimated coefficients on the dummy 
variables. The income and size dummies are found to be insignificant in almost all cases, and 
in all but two cases is the significance of the explanatory variables unaltered: the current 
account balance becomes  insignificant in the consumption-loss equation when a country 
 
                                                 
25 Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), we also try adding a country group for small countries with large 
financial centres (defined as countries with financial openness ratio exceeding 800%), which have been hit 
particularly hard by this crisis. These 10 countries are Belgium, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. In no case is this dummy variable found 
significant, nor does it alter the inference on the other explanatory variables. 21 
 
 
dummy for small countries is added and foreign reserves become insignificant in the banking-
crisis equation when a country dummy for low income countries is added. 
The final part of Table 10 adds continental dummies to the baseline regressions. The 
African dummy variable is found to be highly significant in all the regressions, but as South 
Africa is the only African country in the sample, this dummy variable simply serves as a 
dummy variable for that country. The other continental dummies are found to be insignificant 
in most other cases, and in all cases are the results from the baseline regressions unaffected. 
As a final robustness test, we re-estimate all the baseline regressions dropping one 
observation at a time and check whether the explanatory variables continue to be significant. 
We find that they do in almost all cases. There are, however, four exceptions: dropping Hong 
Kong from the sample makes foreign reserves insignificant in the bank-crisis equation, 
dropping Luxembourg from the sample makes financial openness insignificant in the output-
duration equation and  financial deepening insignificant in the twin-crisis equation, and 
dropping Norway from the sample makes fiscal balances insignificant in the twin-crisis 
equation. We also do a similar sensitivity analysis for the regime dummies. The inference on 
the IT and exchange rate peg dummies is found to be robust to variations in the country 
sample, whereas the dummy variable for floating exchange rate countries become marginally 
insignificant in the consumption-loss equation in some cases, and three other cases give a p-
value close to 0.2 (Russia, South Africa and Turkey). However, leaving out Iceland in the 
consumption-loss equation results  in a highly significant dummy variable for floating 
exchange rate countries. 
 
3.4. Interpreting the results 
In this section we offer an interpretation of what we think are the key results of our paper. 
Before proceeding it should, however, be emphasised that this paper is not a general analysis 
of financial, banking or currency crises, but focuses only on the current crisis and its 
consequences. Therefore, some of the results found in this paper may be specific to this crisis 
and need not generalise to others. However, there are some interesting results worth 
highlighting that may be relevant to understanding not only this crisis but financial crises in 
general, and have some important policy implications.  
One of the most striking results we obtain is how strong the effects of inflation just 
prior to the crisis seems to be, with the inflationary-effect generally the most significant effect 
of  all the initial conditions. Thus, countries with higher inflation tended to experience a 
deeper and more protracted contraction, and were more vulnerable to the risk of a systemic 
banking and currency crises. We believe that this inflationary-effect captures the degree of 
macroeconomic imbalances in the run up to the crisis and policy constraints that countries 
faced in their response to the crisis. The scope for monetary policy easing and its transmission 
to the real economy is affected by current inflationary pressures and to what degree inflation 
expectations are sufficiently anchored. Countries with higher inflation in the run up to the 
crisis were therefore likely to be in a less favourable position  to use monetary stimulus 22 
 
 
measures to counteract the economic impact of the global crisis than countries were inflation 
was already well anchored.
26
Looking at other measures of economic imbalances and vulnerabilities, the general 
story emerges that the greater the macroeconomic imbalances in the run up to the crisis, the 




We also find that the fiscal position played a role in this crisis. Thus, we find that 
greater government debt in the run up to the crisis coincided with a longer output contraction. 
This seems logical: the worse the debt position of the government, the less the fiscal space for 
supporting the recovery after the crisis hit. We also find that larger fiscal deficits prior to the 
crisis tended to increase the risk of a banking or currency crisis. Again, this seems logical: 
larger deficits tend to go hand in hand with higher risk premia which would presumably rise 
sharply once the crisis hit and exacerbate uncertainty that could eventually lead to panic and a 
full blown currency crisis. The significance of this effect depends, however, on the inclusion 
of Norway in the country sample. 
 more output volatility, or lower foreign reserves all seemed to contribute in one 
way or another to a deeper contraction and increased risk of a systemic banking crisis. It is 
interesting to note that the level of foreign reserves did not have any significant effect on the 
probability of a currency crisis. Instead we find that lower reserves increased the risk of a 
banking crisis, which may reflect the interaction between very large banking systems and 
limited ability of the domestic monetary authority to provide foreign  currency liquidity 
services, often pointed out as a major vulnerability during the current crisis. We note, 
however that the effect of reserves is not robust to the exclusion of Hong Kong from the 
country sample and that the interaction between access to central bank swap lines and actual 
reserve holdings can be difficult to control for. 
Furthermore, we also find that the size of the banking system played an important role. 
First, we find that the larger the banking system, the larger the consumption contraction 
tended to be. This is consistent with the interpretation that once the crisis hit, governments 
needing to support large banking systems had less fiscal space to support domestic demand. It 
can also reflect increased households’ dependence on credit for consumption financing in 
countries with larger banking systems. We also find that larger banking systems increased the 
probability of a banking and currency crises. However, our results suggest that a more 
                                                 
26 This finding on the importance of inflation may to a certain extent be interpreted as being at odds with the 
recent recommendation of the IMF’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, and his co-authors (2010) who suggest 
that higher inflation targets, and therefore higher average inflation, makes crisis responses easier by increasing 
the room for lowering interest rates to counteract the crisis. Our results suggest that higher inflation in the run up 
to this crisis made it worse, not better, and these results seem robust to different crisis measures and various 
robustness checks. In particular, it is worth emphasising that they are not driven by few observations of 
extremely high inflation (the highest observed inflation in our sample is 10% and the average inflation rate 
across the country sample is 3.4%). 
27 Interestingly, we find that higher current account deficits tend to exacerbate the consumption contraction but 
have no effects on the output contraction. This seems logical as higher current account deficits call for an 
adjustment in domestic demand, with a net export adjustment (especially through import compression) reducing 
the effect on output. 23 
 
 
developed financial system reduced the risk of a banking or currency crisis. This last finding, 
however, is not robust to excluding Luxembourg from the country sample. 
We find mixed results on whether stronger ties to the global economy through trade 
and finance exacerbated the crisis or not. Thus, stronger trade and financial linkages coincided 
with a larger and longer output contraction, as the global financial panic and the sudden 
reversal of capital inflows and sharp contraction in global demand that followed hit those 
countries especially hard, which relied more heavily on these capital flows or were more open 
to trade. The significant effect of financial openness on the persistence of the output 
contraction is, however, very much driven by the extremely large external balance sheet of 
Luxembourg and excluding Luxembourg from the sample leaves this effect insignificant. 
Thus, any interpretation of a causal link between financial openness and exposure to the 
global crisis will need to take account of the sensitivity to this large outlier. The significance 
of capital inflows however remains when Luxembourg is excluded from the sample. At the 
same time, we find that countries more open to trade recovered faster from the crisis. This 
probably reflects the fact that these countries benefitted more by the relatively rapid reversal 
in global demand (especially in Asia) in 2009 than countries less open to trade. 
We also find some mixed results on the role of exchange rate flexibility. While our 
results suggest that greater exchange rate flexibility reduced both the depth and the duration 
of the contraction, it increased the risk of a banking or currency crisis. Thus, exchange rate 
flexibility facilitated the economic adjustment to the crisis through greater relative price 
flexibility, but at the same time made countries more vulnerable to a banking or currency 
crisis. Flexibility was thus a double-edged sword in this sense. This is further corroborated by 
the effects of different unilateral exchange rate regime dummies: we find that countries with 
unilateral exchange rate pegs had a particularly large and protracted consumption contraction. 
This, however, only applies to countries with exchange rate pegs outside a monetary union: 
we find no evidence that EMU membership led to additional negative effects of the crisis 
comparable to the effects we find for the unilateral peg countries.
28 At the same time we find 
that  countries with a formal inflation target (and sometimes floating exchange rates in 
general) tended to have a smaller contraction and were less likely to have a systemic banking 
crisis.
29
We also find that countries that have experienced a banking or currency crisis in the 
past tended to have a deeper and longer consumption contraction and were more likely to 
suffer a currency crisis. No evidence is found that suggests that past crises experience reduced 
the probability of a banking system crisis in the current crisis. Thus, learning from past crises 
does not seem to have benefitted in the current crisis or, at least, seems to have been 
outweighed by the possible negative effects of past crises experience on credibility of current 
institutions to deal with the crisis. The importance of sound institutions is also suggested by 
  
                                                 
28 Furthermore, we do not analyse possible effects from EMU membership on the probability of sovereign debt 
crisis. Effects from the turmoil in 2010 surrounding the sustainability of sovereign debt of countries within the 
euro area lie outside of our sample period.  
29 This is consistent with Carvalho Filho (2010), who also finds beneficial effects of inflation targeting during the 
current crisis. 24 
 
 
our finding that greater central bank independence reduced the probability of a currency 
crisis. Other institutional factors are not found significant, however.  
Our results indicate a non-significant role for some variables which have been widely 
discussed as having played an important role in determining the economic impact of the crisis. 
Especially, it is noteworthy that we find no role for access to the Fed’s dollar liquidity facility 
for the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. The establishment of central bank swap lines 
has been widely praised for having effectively relieved US dollar liquidity stresses in money 
and FX swap markets and hindering global financial instability from becoming much more 
serious (see e.g. Allen and Moessner, 2010). Our results should however not be interpreted as 
rejecting  the importance of these international facilities as we cannot measure what the 
outcome would have been in their absence. We could also be overlooking the role played by 
the access to central bank swap lines in limiting the scale of a systemic banking crisis as our 
measurement of banking crises does not make any distinction between a banking crisis and a 
total banking  system collapse. Neither do we find a role for our three measures of trade 
structure (the share of manufacturing exports, trade diversification and trade concentration), 
which might emerge if the country sample would be expanded to include more developing 
countries.  
While our finding that exchange rate flexibility seems to facilitate the real adjustment 
to the crisis while at the same time increasing the risk of currency crisis  is plausible, a 
comment with respect to the apparent lack of separate effect of EMU membership is also in 
order. For example, it is important to keep in mind that the pre-crisis initial conditions are 
unlikely to be exogenous to the exchange rate regime in a given country. In addition, within a 
monetary union it is probable that a larger share of external debt and the current account 
deficit would be in domestic currency and thus less likely to be a source of vulnerability. 
Furthermore, it seems obvious that EMU membership protected countries against a currency 
crisis and may thus have helped mitigating the real impact of the crisis through that channel 
(cf. Cecchetti et al., 2009, who find that output losses tend to be much higher in currency 
crises episodes). Finally, as previously mentioned our measure of banking crises does not 
discriminate between the size of different banking crises in our sample. It could for example 
be argued that the large banking collapse in Iceland could have been contained to some extent 
had Iceland been a member of EMU, with stronger institutional support, for example through 
the greater ability of the ECB to provide liquidity support. 
Finally, in terms of specific crisis episodes, we are able to predict quite accurately the 
extent of the crisis in some of the countries hit particularly hard (both in terms of the real 
economy impact and the banking and currency crisis incidences), such as Iceland, Ireland, and 
the three Baltic countries (see Figures 1-4). As can be seen in Figure 5, our statistical models 
suggest that the main reasons for the large and persistent contraction in output and 
consumption in the Baltic countries are the higher-than-average rate of inflation and, to a 
lesser extent, greater  underlying economic volatility  and higher  current account deficits, 
whereas in Iceland and Ireland the main reasons were in addition to the inflationary-effect, the 
greater-than-average financial exposure of these two countries (larger  capital inflows and 
higher private sector leverage in the case of Iceland, larger financial openness and limited 25 
 
 
exchange rate flexibility in the case of Ireland, and the very large banking systems in both 
countries). 
However, some countries did worse than our statistical models predict. For example, 
our models predict a less protracted output contraction in Denmark and a smaller consumption 
loss in Russia, while assigning a relatively small probability of a banking crisis in either 
country. Our probit specifications also fail to spot the currency crisis in Korea.
30
 
 At the same 
time, there are some countries that seem to have done better than predicted by our statistical 
models. For example, we find that the real economy impact in Australia and Poland was 
smaller than the initial conditions suggest and obtain quite a high probability of a banking 
crisis in Sweden which did not materialise. 
4. Conclusions  
The goal of this paper is to try to identify which factors were important in determining the 
macroeconomic  impact  of the recent global financial crisis, and why some countries 
experienced a systemic banking and currency crises while others escaped more lightly. We do 
this by identifying a broad set of potential pre-crisis explanatory variables in a cross-section 
of 46 medium-to-high income countries, framed within four possible channels through which 
the crisis spread out over from financial markets through the real economy all over the world: 
a financial channel, a trade channel, a macro channel and an institutional channel. 
  We find an important role for the macro channel in the propagation of the shock and 
the extent of the crisis, through various measures of pre-crisis macroeconomic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities. Thus, we find that countries that, in the run up to the crisis, had higher 
inflation,  larger  current account deficits,  a more leveraged private sector, greater output 
volatility, or a poorer fiscal position tended to experience some combination of a deeper or 
more protracted contraction in output or consumption, and were more likely to experience a 
systemic banking or currency crisis.  
We also find an important role for the financial channel. Thus, countries with 
relatively large banking systems or stronger global financial linkages tended to experience a 
deeper or longer contraction in output or consumption. In addition we find that large banking 
systems significantly increased the probability of a systemic banking or currency crisis. 
Our results on the trade channel are mixed. While we find that countries with business 
cycles that were closely connected to the global business cycle experienced a deeper output 
contraction, we also find that the output contraction tended to be shorter in those countries 
that were more open to trade. 
We also get mixed results for the role of exchange rate flexibility. We find that greater 
exchange rate flexibility coincided with a smaller and shorter contraction, while at the same 
time increasing the probability of a currency crisis or a combination of a systemic banking 
and currency crisis. We also find that countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs had a 
                                                 
30 Given the relatively small real economy impact on Korea, this could suggest a problem in our definition of a 
currency crisis, which may incorrectly be signalling a currency crisis in Korea rather than suggesting a failure of 
our probit specification to spot the crisis.   26 
 
 
particularly large and protracted consumption contraction, while no comparable evidence is 
found for the EMU countries. This suggests that countries with exchange rate pegs outside a 
monetary union were particularly vulnerable in the current financial crisis. We also find that 
countries with a formal inflation target (and sometimes floating exchange rates in general) 
tended to have a smaller contraction and were less likely to have a systemic banking crisis.  
Finally, we find that past experience of a systemic banking or currency crises had no 
beneficial effect during this crisis. In fact, our results suggest that past crises-countries tended 
to have a deeper and longer contraction and were more likely to suffer a currency crisis. We 
conclude that the possible positive learning effects from past crises is outweighed by loss of 
credibility  resulting  from past crises experience. We also find some tentative evidence 
suggesting the importance of institutional quality in that countries with more independent 
central banks were less likely to experience a currency crisis.  
The policy implications of these results seem clear and perhaps uncontroversial. Thus, 
the key  factors in escaping this global crisis relatively unscathed  seem to have been to 
maintain sound macroeconomic conditions, i.e. avoid allowing large economic imbalances to 
build up, and not allowing the banking system to get too large relative to the economy. Our 
results suggest that economies that achieved this were better able to absorb the financial shock 
and faster to recover from the crisis. Exchange rate flexibility also seemed to have helped 
reducing  the real economy impact and expedite the recovery, but increased the risk of a 
currency crisis at the same time. Exchange rate flexibility, jointly with a formal inflation 
target, however, seemed to have helped reduce the risk of a systemic banking crisis. Although 
we find no significant effects of EMU membership, the fact that the additional negative 
effects of unilateral exchange rate pegs are not found in the case of the EMU countries 
suggests that fixed exchange rates through euro membership mitigated the negative effects of 
exchange rate pegs in the crisis. EMU membership can also have helped through preventing 
the occurrences of currency crises and reducing the size of possible banking crises within 
member countries. 




Table 1. Country sample 
       
Australia  France  Lithuania  Slovakia 
Austria  Germany  Luxembourg  Slovenia 
Belgium  Greece  Malta  Spain 
Bulgaria  Hong Kong  Mexico  Sweden 
Canada  Hungary  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Chile  Iceland  New Zealand  Taiwan 
Croatia  Ireland  Norway  Thailand 
Cyprus  Israel  Poland  Turkey 
Czech Republic  Italy  Portugal  United Kingdom 
Denmark  Japan  Romania  United States 
Estonia  Korea  Russia   
Finland  Latvia  South Africa   
       
Different country groups 
Industrial countries    
  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States 
   
Emerging market economies   
  Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey 
   
Central and Eastern European countries    
  Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
   
Very small open economies    
  Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia 
   
Inflation targeting countries    
  Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom 
   
Unilateral exchange rate pegs   
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Table 2. Average values for different country groups 
                 
  ALL  IND  EME  CEA  VSOE  EMU  IT  PEG 
                 
Depth of output contraction  0.055  0.040  0.076  0.098  0.119  0.051  0.036  0.114 
Depth of consump. contract.  0.044  0.011  0.090  0.125  0.138  0.016  0.025  0.162 
Dur. of output contraction  3.739  3.741  3.737  3.583  4.857  3.938  3.368  4.250 
Dur. of consump. contract.  3.109  2.741  3.632  4.000  3.857  3.000  2.684  4.625 
Frequency of banking crisis  0.283  0.407  0.105  0.167  0.429  0.375  0.158  0.375 
Frequency of currency crisis  0.043  0.074  0.000  0.000  0.143  0.000  0.105  0.000 
                 
GDP level  991  1,394  418  347  30  681  638  386 
GDP per capita  30.0  38.7  17.7  19.2  34.0  35.5  27.1  23.1 
                 
Financial deepening  0.933  1.143  0.633  0.484  1.509  1.217  0.655  0.879 
Size of banking system  2.247  2.949  1.249  0.635  4.338  3.180  2.041  1.391 
Stock market capitalisation  1.164  1.401  0.828  0.478  1.481  1.108  1.143  1.252 
   
Trade openness  0.863  0.764  1.004  1.027  1.112  0.948  0.691  1.190 
Output correlation  0.447  0.524  0.337  0.346  0.465  0.584  0.383  0.329 
Manufacturing exports share  0.666  0.685  0.639  0.682  0.653  0.770  0.577  0.592 
Trade diversification  0.478  0.458  0.508  0.480  0.570  0.442  0.511  0.511 
Trade concentration  0.166  0.156  0.181  0.153  0.229  0.143  0.188  0.171 
   
Financial openness  10.545  15.117  4.047  2.116  42.907  22.834  3.680  5.229 
Capital inflows  0.059  0.040  0.087  0.081  0.038  0.043  0.054  0.122 
Access to US$ liquidity  0.609  0.852  0.263  0.167  0.571  1.000  0.474  0.125 
   
Output volatility  0.020  0.015  0.026  0.028  0.023  0.015  0.021  0.028 
Exchange rate variability  0.031  0.021  0.044  0.043  0.019  0.014  0.039  0.045 
Exchange rate noise  0.137  0.097  0.209  0.211  0.177  0.101  0.155  0.203 
                 
Inflation rate  0.034  0.022  0.050  0.056  0.044  0.024  0.034  0.058 
Current account balance  -0.030  0.006  -0.082  -0.101  -0.124  -0.030  -0.015  -0.085 
Size of foreign reserves  0.173  0.110  0.263  0.213  0.311  0.131  0.135  0.300 
Financial leverage  1.494  1.607  1.332  1.399  1.842  1.464  1.512  1.662 
Fiscal balance  0.010  0.018  0.000  -0.007  0.018  0.000  0.018  0.021 
Government debt  0.461  0.555  0.327  0.269  0.272  0.578  0.415  0.166 
                 
Government effectiveness  1.176  1.601  0.571  0.491  1.260  1.284  1.215  0.797 
Regulatory quality  1.167  1.448  0.767  0.781  1.345  1.324  1.104  1.010 
Legal structure  7.299  7.930  6.403  6.244  7.493  7.494  7.285  6.912 
Central bank independence  0.831  0.822  0.843  0.858  0.807  0.845  0.806  0.835 
Credit market regulation  8.879  8.895  8.855  8.892  9.300  8.766  8.884  9.228 
Labour market regulation  5.976  6.085  5.821  5.921  5.994  5.403  6.213  6.212 
Business regulation  6.853  7.460  5.991  5.964  6.752  6.824  6.989  6.526 
Economic freedom index  7.402  7.648  7.052  6.974  7.400  7.383  7.403  7.321 
Past banking crisis  0.522  0.296  0.842  1.000  0.429  0.250  0.632  0.750 
Past currency crisis  0.435  0.333  0.579  0.500  0.429  0.313  0.526  0.625 
The values for the current and past banking and currency crisis and access to US$ liquidity report the 
average number of countries in each group which experienced a banking and currency crisis. All variables 
are measured in percentages, except the duration of the output and consumption contractions (in quarters), 
the GDP level and per capita (in billions and thousand of US dollars respectively), trade diversification, 
trade concentration and central bank independence (indices between 0 and 1), government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality (indices between -2.5 and 2.5) and credit market regulation, labour market regulations, 
business regulation and the economic freedom index (indices between 0 and 10). ‘All’ denotes the whole 
country sample, ‘IND’ denotes the 27 industrial countries, ‘EME’ denotes the 19 emerging market 
economies, ‘CEA’ denotes the 12 central and eastern European countries, ‘VSOE’ denotes the 7 very small 
open economies, ‘EMU’ denotes the 16 EMU countries, ‘IT’ denotes the 19 inflation targeting countries, 
and ‘PEG’ denotes the 8 countries with unilateral exchange rate pegs. Bolded (underlined) numbers denote 
significant difference between individual group averages and the whole sample average, allowing for 






Table 3. Regression results for the depth of the output contraction 
             
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           















           















           















           















           















           















           
EMU dummy    0.005 
(0.661) 
[0.617] 
     
Inflation targeting dummy      -0.025 
(0.014) 
[0.022] 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy          -0.014 
(0.200) 
[0.148] 
           
R
2  0.726  0.728  0.766  0.738  0.738 
Standard error  0.032  0.033  0.030  0.032  0.032 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 




Table 4. Regression results for the depth of the consumption contraction 
             
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           















           















           















           















           















           
EMU dummy    -0.014 
(0.415) 
[0.190] 
     
Inflation targeting dummy      -0.032 
(0.034) 
[0.040] 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy          -0.027 
(0.081) 
[0.099] 
           
R
2  0.704  0.708  0.735  0.794  0.726 
Standard error  0.050  0.050  0.048  0.042  0.049 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-
values based on robust (White) standard errors. 
 




Table 5. Regression results for the duration of output contraction 
             
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           















           















           















           















           















           















           















           















           
EMU dummy    -0.457 
(0.205) 
[0.156] 
     
Inflation targeting dummy      -0.124 
(0.701) 
[0.682] 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy          0.040 
(0.905) 
[0.898] 
           
R
2  0.494  0.515  0.495  0.521  0.494 
Standard error  0.930  0.922  0.941  0.916  0.942 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-








Table 6. Regression results for the duration of consumption contraction 
             
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           















           















           















           
EMU dummy    0.012 
(0.977) 
[0.977] 
     
Inflation targeting dummy      -0.535 
(0.175) 
[0.127] 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy          -0.547 
(0.168) 
[0.120] 
           
R
2  0.358  0.358  0.386  0.411  0.386 
Standard error  1.237  1.252  1.224  1.198  1.223 
Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on conventional standard errors, while numbers in brackets are p-








Table 7. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a banking crisis 
             
    Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           










           















           















           















           















           
EMU dummy    0.586 
[8.18] 
(0.414) 
     
Inflation targeting dummy      -2.276 
[-8.10] 
(0.018) 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy        -1.538 
[-5.78] 
(0.047) 
           
Log-likelihood  -11.706  -11.437  -8.592  -10.491  -10.031 
Pseudo R
2  0.573  0.582  0.686  0.617  0.634 
Cases correct  37  39  41  41  39 
Percent gain  0.308  0.462  0.615  0.615  0.462 
Numbers in brackets are marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of a banking crisis (× 100 to convert into percentages), evaluated at the mean of the data, 
except when reporting the marginal effects for the dummy variables, in which case the numbers are the 
effects of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a banking crisis. Numbers in parenthesis are p-
values based on robust (Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number of cases 
predicted correctly by each model, using a cut-off point of 50%, while the percent gain shows the 











Table 8. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a currency crisis 
     






       
Constant  -20.558  -  0.004 
       
log of GDP per capita  5.471  2.10E-7  0.002 
       
Size of banking system  1.040  1.10E-7  0.005 
       
Exchange rate variability  62.843  6.63E-7  0.003 
       
Fiscal balances  -40.440  -4.27E-7  0.005 
       
Central bank independence  -13.353  -1.41E-7  0.016 
       
Past banking crisis  7.402  0.89  0.003 
     
Log-likelihood  -3.075   
Pseudo R
2  0.626   
Cases correct  45   
Percent gain  0.500   
The table reports the marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variables on the probability of a currency crisis (×  100 to convert into 
percentages), evaluated at the mean of the data, except when reporting the 
marginal effects for ‘Past banking crisis’, in which case the number is the effect 
of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a currency crisis. The p-values are 
based on robust (Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number 
of cases predicted correctly by the model, using a cut-off point of 50%, while 
the percent gain shows the percent of incorrect cases predicted by a simple 












Table 9. Probit estimates of the likelihood of a banking, currency or twin crisis 
             
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           















           















           















           















           















           















           










           










           
EMU dummy    -0.097 
[-2.11] 
(0.883) 
     
Inflation targeting dummy    -0.505 
[-9.84] 
(0.495) 
   




Floating exchange rate dummy        -0.448 
[-8.81] 
(0.527) 
           
Log-likelihood  -14.185  -14.176  -13.831  -13.294  -13.907 
Pseudo R
2  0.555  0.555  0.566  0.583  0.564 
Cases correct  39  39  40  41  40 
Percent gain  0.500  0.500  0.571  0.643  0.571 
Numbers in brackets are marginal effects of a one-unit change in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of a banking or a currency crisis (× 100 to convert into percentages), evaluated at the mean of 
the data, except when reporting the marginal effects for the dummy variables, in which case the numbers 
are the effects of a change from 0 to 1 on the probability of a banking or a crisis. The marginal effects on 
the probability of a twin crisis are extremely small and therefore not reported. The marginal effects on the 
probability of no crisis are therefore practically the same as the marginal effects on the probability of 
either banking or currency crisis, but with reversed signs. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values based on 
robust (Hubert-White) standard errors. Cases correct show the number of cases predicted correctly by each 
model, using a cut-off point of 50%, while the percent gain shows the percent of incorrect cases predicted 
by a simple constant-probability specification corrected by each model. 
 




Table 10. Robustness analysis: adding different country group dummies 
             


















             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












The table reports estimated parameters for country group dummy variables in each equation from 
Specification 1 in Tables 3-9, except for the probit model for currency crisis, where identification 
problems made it impossible to add country group dummies to the model specification. The country 
groups are explained in Table 2. ‘High income countries’ represents the upper GDP per capita quartile of 
the  country sample, ‘Mid-income countries’ represents the two mid GDP per capita quartiles of the 
country sample, while ‘Low income countries’ represents the low GDP per capita quartile of the country 






Figure 1. Actual and fitted output and consumption contraction 
(Specification 1 in Tables 3 and 4) 
 
 
Figure 2. Actual and fitted output and consumption contraction duration 
(Specification 1 in Tables 5 and 6) 
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Residual (share smaller than 2SE)
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Figure 3. Actual and fitted banking and currency crisis  
(Specification 1 in Tables 7 and 8) 
 
 
Figure 4. Actual and fitted banking and currency crisis  
(Specification 1 in Table 9) 
 















































Probability of a banking crisis
Fitted
Residual (share smaller than 2SE)
Residual (share larger than 2SE)















































Probability of a currency crisis
Fitted
Residual (share smaller than 2SE)
Residual (share larger than 2SE)
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Figure 5. Baseline predictions of output and consumption losses and duration in selected 
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Appendix: The data 
 
Table A1. Data definitions and sources 
     
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Dependent variables 
Depth of output 
contraction 
Log difference of seasonally adjusted GDP 
level from peak in 2007Q1-2008Q4 to 
2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
     
Depth of consumption 
contraction 
Log difference of seasonally adjusted private 
consumption level from peak in 2007Q1-
2008Q4 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
     
Duration of output 
contraction 
Numbers of quarters with negative quarter-on-
quarter growth in seasonally adjusted GDP 
from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 




Numbers of quarters with negative quarter-on-
quarter growth in seasonally adjusted private 
consumption from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Global 
Insight 
     
Banking crisis  Indicator variable for a systemic banking 
crisis: defined as 1 if a country’s corporate 
and financial sectors experience a large 
number of defaults and financial institutions 
and corporations face great difficulties 
repaying contracts on time leading to a rise in 
non-performing loans and an almost complete 
exhaustion of aggregate banking system 
capital and 0 otherwise 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
updated database and authors 
own elaboration 
     
Currency crisis  Indicator variable for a currency crisis: 
defined as 1 if the annual average of the 
nominal effective exchange rate depreciated 
by 30% or more in 2008-2009 and if this 
depreciation is also at least a 10 percentage 
points increase in the rate of depreciation 
compared to the two year period before and 0 
otherwise 
Effective exchange rates from 
the BIS database 
     
Economic structure 
GDP level  GDP level in 2008 (PPP adjusted billion US$)  CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
     
GDP per capita  GDP per capita in 2008 (PPP adjusted 
thousand US$) 
CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
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Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
     
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Financial structure and development 
Financial deepening  Broad money (M2) as a share of GDP in 2007  IMF/IFS and local central 
banks 
     
Size of banking system  Total assets of the 5 largest banks in each 
country as a share of GDP in 2007  
The Banker (2008) database 
     
Stock market 
capitalisation 
Market value of publicly traded stocks as a 
share of GDP in 2007 
CIA World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov/publications/fact
book) 
     
International real linkages 
Trade openness  Imports and exports as a share of GDP in 2007  IMF/IFS 
     
Output correlation  Correlation of cyclical part of seasonally 
adjusted domestic GDP and world output 
1985Q1-2007Q4 (or time period available, 
using the HP filter to generate trend GDP. For 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and the 
US world output is measured using world 
output excluding  each of these countries 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin, local 
central banks and Pétursson 
(2010) 
     
Manufacturing exports 
share 
Share of manufacturing exports (SITC 5 to 8, 
less 667 and 68) in total merchandise exports 
in 2006  
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
     
Trade diversification  A modified Finger-Kreinen index of trade 
similarities, measuring to what extent a 
country’s trade structure in 2006 differs from 
that of the average country. Index ranging 
from 0 to 1, with higher numbers indicating a 
bigger difference from the world average 
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
     
Trade concentration  A Herfindahl-Hirschmann index measuring 
the degree of market concentration in 
country’s trade in 2006. Index ranging from 0 
to 1, with higher numbers indicating greater 
market concentration in trade 
UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
     
International financial linkages 
Financial openness  Sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a share 
of GDP in 2007 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006); updated database 
     
Capital inflows  FDI inward flows as share of GDP in 2007   UN/UNCTAD database 
(www.unctad.org/Handbook) 
     
Access to US$ 
liquidity 
Indicator variable for participation in the US 
Fed liquidity program in 2008: defined as 1 if 
a country participated in the liquidity program 
and 0 otherwise 
McGuire and von Peter (2009)  
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Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
     
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Underlying economic volatility 
Output volatility  Standard deviation of cyclical component of 
seasonally adjusted GDP in 1985Q1-2007Q4 
(or time period available, using the HP filter to 
generate trend GDP 
Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin and 
local central banks 
     
Exchange rate 
variability 
Standard deviation of quarterly changes in 
effective nominal exchange rates in 1994-
2007 
Effective exchange rates from 
the BIS database 
     
Exchange rate noise  A measure of the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate risk premium, i.e. the present 
value of the rational expectations deviation 
from the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition in effective exchange rates. 
Estimated for the period 1990Q1-2005Q4 and 
available for all the countries except, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania and Russia. 
Pétursson (2010) 
     
Economic imbalances and vulnerabilities 
Inflation rate  Average consumer price inflation in 2007  Eurostat, Reuters/EcoWin and 
local central banks 
     
Current account 
balance 
Current account balance as a share of GDP in 
2007 
IMF/IFS 
     
Size of foreign 
reserves 
Foreign reserves as a share of GDP in 2007   IMF/IFS 
     
Financial leverage  Ratio of domestic credit to domestic deposits 
in 2007  
 
IMF/IFS 
     
Fiscal balance  General government balance as a share of 
GDP in 2007 
IMF/IFS, Eurostat, 
Reuters/EcoWin, local central 
banks and statistical offices 
     
Government debt  General government debt as a share of GDP in 
2007 
IMF/IFS, Eurostat, 
Reuters/EcoWin, local central 
banks and statistical offices 
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Table A1. Data definitions and sources (cont.) 
     
Variable  Description  Source 




A measure of government governance quality. 
Index from 2007 ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values indicating more effective 
governments 
World Bank database 
(http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/index.asp) 
     
Regulatory quality  A measure of regulatory quality. Index from 
2007 ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values indicating greater regulatory quality 
World Bank database 
(http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/wgi/index.asp) 
     
Legal structure and 
security of property 
rights 
A measure of quality of legal system covering 
judicial independence, impartiality of courts, 
protection of property rights, military 
interference in rule of law, integrity of legal 
system, legal enforcement of contracts and 
restrictions on sale of real property. Index 
from 2006, ranging from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating greater quality of legal 
system 




     
Central bank 
independence 
A measure of central bank overall 
independence. Index ranging from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating greater independence 
Fry et al. (2000) 
     
Credit market 
regulations 
A measure of regulatory burden in the 
domestic credit market. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with lower values 
indicating greater regulatory burden 





     
Labour market 
regulations 
A measure of regulatory burden in the 
domestic labour market. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with lower values 
indicating greater regulatory burden 





     
 Business regulations  A measure of regulatory burden in general 
business activities. Index from 2006 ranging 
from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating 
greater regulatory burden 





     
Economic freedom 
index 
Overall economic freedom index, weighing 
together sub-indices covering size of 
government, legal structure, access to sound 
money, freedom of international trade, and 
regulation of markets. Index from 2006 
ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating greater economic freedom 





     
Past banking crisis  Indicator variable for past banking crisis: 
defined as 1 if it has experienced a banking 
crisis in the past 30 years and 0 otherwise 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
     
Past currency crisis  Indicator variable for past currency crisis: 
defined as 1 if it has experienced a banking 
crisis in the past 30 years and 0 otherwise 
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